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CRIMINAL LAW-CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS--RoLE OF IN 
CAMERA HEARING IN THE QUESTION OF DISCLOSURE OF IN­
FORMANT'S IDENTITY~tate v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 
1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After three previous proceedings ended in mistrials, Vincent 
Wandix was convicted in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, 
Missouri, of selling a controlled substance, heroin. 1 The principal 
witnesses against Wandix were Officers Dobbins and Bates of the 
St. Louis Police Department. 2 According to the testimony of Offi­
cer Dobbins, a confidential informant introduced Officer Dobbins 
to Wandix while Officer Bates conducted surveillance from a dis­
tance. Following a brief conversation, Wandix instructed Officer 
Dobbins and the informant to follow him to a certain address. After 
picking up Officer Bates, Officer Dobbins and the informant fol­
lowed Wandix to the specified address. Officer Bates was dropped 
off before the pair rejoined Wandix. Officer Dobbins entered the 
residence with the person identified at trial as Wandix and pur­
chased twenty dollars worth of heroin. Officer Dobbins testified 
that the informant did not enter the residence but remained in the 
car during the transaction. Officer Bates stated that all three en­
tered the residence, contradicting Officer Dobbins. Apparently, no 
one else was at the address. Both officers identified Wandix in 
court as the seller of the heroin. Prior to the investigation neither 
officer knew the informant and neither officer used the informant 
as a source of information subsequent to the incident in question. 
Wandix was not personally known to Officer Dobbins, but Officer 
Bates testified that he might have seen him before. 3 
Wandix, in his defense, claimed that he was mistakenly 
identified as the drug seller. He introduced the testimony of alibi 
witnesses and moved for disclosure of the police informant's iden­
tity. Defense counsel argued that the informant was the only lay 
witness available to support the defendant's alibi testimony and 
1. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.020 (1969). 
2. State v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d 82, 83 (Mo. 1979) (en bane), eert. denied, 445 
U.S. 972 (1980). 
3. Id. 
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that his testimony was necessary to enable Wandix to receive a fair 
trial. 4 
The prosecution opposed the motion for disclosure at trial, as­
serting that its sources were guaranteed confidentiality under the 
informer's privilege which permits the government to maintain the 
anonymity of those who communicate information concerning viola­
tions of law to law enforcement officials. 5 The motion for disclosure 
was denied by the trial judge; at the close of the trial, the jury re­
turned a verdict of guilty. 6 
The question to be resolved on appeal by the Supreme Court 
of Missouri was whether the trial judge abused his discretion by 
denying defendant's motion for disclosure of the informant's iden­
tity.7 The supreme court, sitting en bane, considered whether the 
identity of the informant should have been disclosed in light of the 
standards set forth in Roviaro v. United States,S decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1957. The Roviaro Court rea­
soned that the informer's privilege belongs to the government and 
not to the informant and that "[t]he purpose of the privilege is the 
furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law 
enforcement."9 By preserving the anonymity of informants the gov­
ernment encourages communications to law enforcement officials. 
The court, in State v. Wandix,lo summarized Roviaro as 
requiring disclosure of the informant's identity when the infor­
mant's testimony would be "relevant and crucial"l1 to the defense of 
4. Id. at 84. 
5. See text accompanying notes 43-53 infra. 
6. State v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d at 83. 
7. Id. 
8. 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 

A ... limitation on the applicability of the privilege [of nondisclosure] arises 

from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an 

informer's identity ... is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, 

or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. 

Id. at 60-61 (footnote omitted). 
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The 
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the 
flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. 
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on 
the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime 
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's 
testimony, anc;l other relevant factors. 
Id. at 62. See also text accompanying note 55 infra for the facts of Roviaro. 
9. 353 U.S. at 59. 
10. 590 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1979) (en bane), em. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). 
11. 590 S.W.2d at 85. 
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the accused and when the defendant's need for such testimony out­
weighed the state's interest in nondisclosure. 12 Balancing the 
competing interests requires consideration of relevant factors on 
both sides of the issue. Roviaro and subsequent cases have found 
the need for disclosure of the informant's identity to be required in 
certain specific situations: When the informant was the sole partici­
pant, other than the accused, in tne criminal transaction; or when 
he actively participated, or played an integral role, in the crime 
charged. 13 The level of the informant's participation in the criminal 
transaction for which the defendant is charged becomes particularly 
significant when his testimony would be relevant and helpful to the 
defense of the accused, most notably in cases in which the infor­
mant is the only "witness in a position to amplify or contradict the 
testimony of government witnesses."14 In Wandix the state as­
serted that disclosure should not be permitted because the accused 
failed to show the necessity for the testimony of the informant, 
there was no evidence that the informant participated in the trans­
action, and the defense failed to show that the informant's testi­
mony would be exculpatory. IS 
The court was not persuaded by this argument and ordered 
disclosure of the informant's identity. The court found that, since 
the defense had presented alibi testimony, the sole question was 
the identity of the drug seller. Following the "relevant and help­
ful"16 standard set forth in Roviaro, the court noted that the testi­
mony of an undisclosed informant could be vital to a mistaken 
identity defense. 17 The Wandix majority relied on language in 
State v. Nafziger,18 which stated that participation did not require 
actual involvement by the informant in the crime charged. 19 
Rather, Roviaro's participation element could be met and disclo­
sure required when the informant was present "at some critical 
stage of the proceedings so that he is qualified to testify concerning 
essential facts in the case. "20 
12. Id. The court, in applying Roviam's standards apparently used the phrases 
"relevant and helpful," "relevant and crucial," and "relevant and material" inter­
changeably. 
13. State v. Davis, 450 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1970); State v. Edwards, 317 S.W.2d 
441 (Mo. 1958) (en bane). 
14. 353 U.S. at 64. 
15. 590 S.W.2d at 85. 
16. 353 U.S. at 62. 
17. 590 S.W. 2d at 85. 
18. 534 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. App. 1975). 
19. ld. at 482. 
20. ld. 
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In a four-to-three decision, the Wandix court found that the 
accused's need for the informant's testimony outweighed the state's 
interest in preserving the anonymity of its sources. The informant's 
testimony was crucial to the accused's defense. Whether the in­
formant had entered the residence with Officer Dobbins was 
unrelated to a determination of the drug seller's identity; the dis­
crepancy between the testimony of Officers Bates and Dobbins, re­
garding whether the informant had entered the house, created 
doubt as to the reliability of their identification of defendant. The 
defense had introduced the testimony of four alibi witnesses, and 
since the informant was the only lay witness who could refute the 
identification made by the police, his testimony would be "relevant 
and material" to the defense. 21 In contrast, the state's interest in 
preserving the informant's confidentiality was minimal: The infor­
mant was no longer active as a police source; he had provided no in­
formation for over a year preceding trial; and no testimony in the 
record indicated that the life of the informant would be endan­
gered as a result of disclosure. The general policy of the informer's 
privilege, therefore, was inadequate to deny disclosure. 22 
Justice Rendlen, joined by two other justices, vehemently dis­
sented to the majority opinion, stating that the informant was 
merely "an observer or minor participant in a criminal transac­
tion."23 Justice Rendlen distinguished Roviaro24 because that case 
involved an informant who was the sole participant, other than the 
accused, in the offense charged. 25 In addition, when Roviaro con­
fronted the informant at the police station subsequent to his arrest, 
the informant denied that he knew or had ever seen defendant. 26 
The dissent in Wandix thus urged that disclosure is warranted 
under Roviaro only when the informant demonstrates a high 
level of participation in the crime charged. This view finds support 
in the facts of Roviaro but not in the language of the decision. 
Justice Rendlen compared Wandix with two other Missouri 
decisions, State v. TilcocP7 and State v. Taylor. 28 The informant's 
level of involvement in both cases was similar to that in Wandix. 
21. 590 S.W.2d at 86. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. See discussion of Roviaro at text accompanying notes 53-67 infra. 
25. 590 S.W.2d at 88. 
26. Id. 
27. 522 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App. 1975). 
28. 508 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. App. 1974). 
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Both cases, however, are distinguishable from Wandix. In Tilcock, 
the court reserved decision on whether to order disclosure until 
sufficient testimony had been given to show the informant's role in 
the entire transaction. 29 Defendant in Tilcock was charged with 
selling narcotics to an undercover agent. Though the informant had 
been present in the bar where the transaction occurred, disclosure 
was denied for the following reasons: The informant had not 
witnessed a critical stage of the transaction due to the distance be­
tween the informant and the drug seller; an undercover officer, po­
sitioned between the informant and the accused in a narrow hall­
way, had obstructed the informant's view; and the informant's 
attention had been diverted continually because he had been act­
ing as a lookout. 30 The court also noted that the informant's role in 
the transaction was minor so the potential usefulness to the defense 
of the informant's testimony was not sufficient to outweigh the 
public interest. 31 In fact, the defense failed to make clear to the 
court why the informant's testimony was necessary to its case. The 
record contains no indication of any discrepancy between the testi­
mony of the state witnesses, and it does not show that the accused 
sought to develop a defense of mistaken identity.32 The defense 
thus failed to establish the need for the testimony of the informant. 
Taylor is even less persuasive authority for denying disclosure. 
In that case the undercover officer and the informant went to an 
apartment, where a number of people were present, to purchase 
drugs. The informant was present at the transaction but was not 
the sole witness. 33 The identity of defendant, the contents of the 
capsules, and defendant's knowledge of the contents were not in 
question so defendant's need for the informant's identity was not 
compelling. 34 In dicta,the Taylor court stated: 
participation alone is not sufficient to require disclosure . . . . 
[W]here there is participation plus other factors, such as mis­
taken identity, contradictory testimony, or a denial of the accusa­
tion, or where the informant is the sole witness, then for pur­
poses of fairness the identi'ty [of the informant] may be required 
to be disclosed. 35 
29. S22 S.W.2d at 62. 
30. ld. 
31. ld. 
32. S08 S.W.2d at S12. 
33. ld. at S08. 
34. ld. at S12. 
3S. ld. 
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The dissenting opinion in Wandix3S ' also asserted that defen­
dant failed to meet' the burden of showing that the testimony of the 
informant would be relevant, helpful and necessary to ,a fair deter­
mination of the cause. 37 By asserting the defense of mistaken iden­
tity and by introducing the testimony of alibi witnesses, however, 
appellant clearly revealed to the court the necessity for, and the' 
substance of, the informant's testimony. The record shows that de­
fendant's request for disclosure was much more than mere ,s,pec'ula­
tion' andconjecture. " " 
The dissenting justices also would deny disclosure in :Wandix 
ont}:le basis of Justice Rendlen's theory that defendant 'was 'aware' 
of the informant's identity 'and thus was capable of calling him 'as a 
witness. 38 This assumption is drawn solely from the testimony of 
the undercover officers and ignores the affirmative defense of mis-, 
taken identity, buttressed by the testimony of alibi witnesses" set 
forth in,Wandix. 39 In Roviaro, the 'prosecution had opposed, de­
fendant's motion for disclosure, by asserting that defendant knew 
the informant's identity.4o The Court noted that when the prosecu­
tion's claims are contradicted by testimony and the trial court 
makes no factual finding that the defendant knew the identity of 
the informant, it cannot be assumed that the informant was known 
to the defendant or available to him as a witness. 41 The trial judge 
in Wandix made no such factual finding. 
This approach, not acknowledged by the dissent in Wandix, 
recognizes that, even if the prosecution is correct in its allegation 
that the defendant knew the identity of the informant, the informa­
tion may be useless to him: The defendant may know the inform­
ant only by an alias; the informant may have relocated and adopted 
a new identity; or the prosecution may be concealing the location 
of the informant. The majority of the Wandix court sought to pre­
vent the government from shifting the responsibility for producing 
the informant at trial to the defendant simply by alleging that the 
informant and the defendant were acquainted. 
The disparity between the Wandix majority and dissent pro­
vides telling evidence that an intermediate method of resolving the 
disclosure question is needed. Under Roviaro the need for disclo­
36. 590 S.W.2d at 92 (Rendlen, J., dissenting). 
37. [d. at 90. 
38. Id. at 92. 
39. 353 U.S. at 60 n.7. 
40. Id. at n.B. 
41. [d. 
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sure must be established with evidence that is more than specula­
tive or conjectural. This principle has a natural corollary: the trial 
court's decision also should be based on more than mere specula­
tion and conjecture. The Missouri Supreme Court should have re­
manded Wandix to the trial court with instructions to conduct an 
in camera hearing at which the interests of the defendant and the 
state could be balanced. A judge may balance the conflicting inter­
ests of the parties only if he had the critical information before 
him. The only way such information may be placed properly before 
him without prejudice to either party is via an in camera hearing. 
The facts of Wandix are particularly suited to the in camera pro­
ceeding, but a hearing may be even more crucial in instances in 
which the facts, or the defense relied upon, make it difficult for the 
defense to demonstrate the need for the informant's testimony.42 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF INFORMER PRIVILEGE 
The privilege of confidentiality granted to communications 
made by informants to government officials historically has be­
longed to the government and not to th'e informant since it is 
based on the public policy of encouraging communications to law 
enforcement agencies. 43 Early cases held that disclosure of an in­
formant's identity was within the absolute discretion of the govern­
ment "to be exercised according to its views of what the interests 
of the public require."44 In Vogel v. Gruaz45 the United States Su­
preme Court stated: "[p]ublic policy will protect all such communi­
cations, absolutely, and without reference to the motive or intent 
of the informer or the question of probable cause .... ':46 Further, 
it was deemed to be the right and duty of every citizen to commu­
nicate knowledge of violations of law to government officials in con­
fidence, and it was the duty of the government to assure that the 
right could be exercised freely, without threat of violence. 47 
42. For discussion of related topics which are beyond the scope of this note, 
see ]. Hatchett, Discovering the Identity of the Informers, 46 FLA. B.]. 644 (1972)' 
(disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant with respect to probable 
cause); Comment, Defendant's Right to a Confidential Informant's Identity, 40 LA. 
L. REv. 147 (1979) (concerning the issue of disclosure in light of the defendant's 
sixth amendment rights). 
43. Annot., 83 L. Ed. 155 (1939). 
44. Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488-89\ (1872). 
45. 110 U.S. 311 (1884). \ 
46. Id. at 315. 
47. In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895). The court stated: 

It is the duty of the government to see that he may exercise this right freely, 
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In 	Missouri, the informer's privilege was recognized in State 
v. Bailey. 48 It granted to law enforcement officials the unqualified 
right to withhold an informant's identity.49 The privilege was sub­
ject to one limitation: disclosure of the informant's identity would 
be required when necessary to show the innocence of the ac­
cused.50 The right of an accused to exculpatory testimony and a fair 
trial was considered to be of greater importance to the system of 
justice than preserving the anonymity of the informant. 
Although the privilege retained its basic form, courts found 
ways to avoid applying it rigidly. The privilege against disclosure 
became absolute with respect to mere informers or tipsters. 51 Dis­
closure, however, could be ordered if an informant actively partici­
pated in the criminal transaction for which the defendant was 
charged or if his identity was essential to the defense. 52 It was at 
this stage of the privilege's evolution that Roviaro was decided. In 
1957 Roviaro announced the modern approach to informer commu­
nications: disclosure of the informant's identity depends upon the 
conflicting interests existing within the framework of each case. 53 
The critical elements to be ascertained and evaluated are the level 
of the informant's activities in the crime charged, the defendant's 
need for the informant's testimony, and the degree of public inter­
est. 54 
In Roviaro the informant was the only participant and witness, 
other than the seller, in a drug transaction that took place in the 
informant's car. A federal agent hid in the trunk to monitor the 
conversation. Another agent saw defendant alight from the car, 
and to protect him from violence while so doing. This duty does not arise 
solely from the interest of the party concerned, but from the necessity of the 
government itself, that its service shall be free from the adverse influence of 
force and fraud practised on its agents.... 
[d. 	at 536. 
48. 320 Mo. 271, 8 S.W.2d 57 (1928). 
49. It would be against public policy to compel a sheriff or other officer to 
disclose the identity of the person or persons who inform him of facts 
tending to show that a given person is guilty of felony. If information of this 
character cannot be given to an officer freely and without fear on the part of 
the informant that his part in the arrest and prosecution of one suspected of 
felony will be made public, the detection and prosecution of crime will be 
intolerably hampered and be defeated altogether in many instances. 
[d. 	at 277,8 S.W.2d at 59. 
SO. Annot., 83 L. Ed. 155, 157 (1939). 
51. Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1947). 
52. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938). 
53. 353 U.S. at 60-61. 
54. [d. at 62. 
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walk to a tree, and then return to the car. Defendant made a 
motion as if he were depositing a package in the car, waved to the 
informant, and walked away. Roviaro was arrested at his home 
later that night and taken to police headquarters where he was 
confronted by the informant who denied he knew or had ever seen 
Roviaro. 55 Despite defense motions for disclosure, the government 
refused to produce the informant at trial. Defendant was convicted. 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground 
that the informant was the sole participant, other than the accused, 
in the transaction charged. 56 Thus "[ t]he informer was the only 
witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of the 
government witnesses."57 The Court hypothesized that, since the 
informant had helped to set up the occurrence and had played a 
prominent part in it, "[h]is testimony might have disclosed an 
entrapment. He might have thrown doubt upon ... [the defen­
dant's] identity or on the identity of the package. "58 
Roviaro, however, did not limit disclosure to those cases in 
which the informant is the sole participant, other than the accused, 
in the crime charged. Rather, the Court stated that the question of 
disclosure requires a balancing of conflicting interests on a case-by­
case basis. "Whether a proper balance renders non-disclosure erro­
neous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, 
taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, 
the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other rel­
evant factors."59 
Rovario is significant because it permitted the trial court to 
exercise discretion in "balancing the public interest . . . [with] 
the individual's right to prepare his defense,"6o as mandated by the 
"fundamental requirements of fairness."61 The decision as to the 
appropriateness and necessity of disclosing the informant's identity 
thus was vested in the trial court, to be determined by considering 
all relevant factors according to the standards set forth in Roviaro. 
III. IMPACT OF ROVIARO ON THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE 
The Roviaro Court recognized that a rigid rule could not 
achieve the goals of guaranteeing a fair trial to an accused and ulti­
55. Id. at 58. 
56. Id. at 64-65. 
57. Id. at 64. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 62. 
60. Id. 
61. [d. at 60. 
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mately attaining justice. For this reason, the Court established the 
"balancing of interests" test to determine the appropriateness of 
disclosure. 62 Factors that the court must consider are "the crime 
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the in­
former's testimony, and other relevant factors. "63 The court's task 
is to balance the public interest in protecting the free flow of infor­
mation by maintaining the anonymity of the informant against the 
individual's right to prepare his defense. 64 Factors that weigh in 
the public interest include the continued activity of the informant 
in other investigations, the potential danger to the informant if his 
identity is disclosed, the credibility of the informant, and the in­
herent difficulty in recruiting informants if their anonymity cannot 
be guaranteed. 65 
Despite the rigid interpretation urged by Justice Rendlen in 
his dissent in Wandix,66 few courts have limited disclosure to the 
narrow facts of Roviaro. 67 Many courts have required that the in­
formant be an active participant in the crime before disclosure will 
be allowed, but the exact level and nature of the informant's activ­
ity is the subject of much dispute. 68 In State v. Milligan69 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court refused to require disclosure of an infor­
mant's identity when defendant denied making the sale of drugs to 
an undercover officer. The officer testified that he had been intro­
62. Id. at 61-62. 
63. Id. at 62. 
64. Id. 
65. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra. 
66. Justice Rendlen's narrow reading of Roviaro is discussed in text accompa­
nying notes 23-26 supra. 
67. 353 U.S. at 57-58. The informant, who was in the front seat of the car with 
defendant while the agent hid in the trunk, paid for and received the narcotics from 
the seller. The informant was the sale participant, other than defendant, in the crime 
charged. 
68. In State v. Milligan, 71 N.J. 373, 365 A.2d 914 (1976), the informant intro­
duced the undercover policeman to the defendant, was present throughout the meet­
ing, participated in the general discussion, and went to the defendant's house with 
them. He did not negotiate the sale and was in the bathroom when the sale took 
place. The court held that disclosure was not required since the informant's im'olve­
ment was marginal, and the significance of his testimony was "speculative." Id. at 
394, 365 A.2d at 925. 
In United States v. Alonzo, 571 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847 
(1978), the informant was present when the narcotics transaction occurred, but his 
level of participation was not great enough to make disclosure of his identity "rele­
vant and helpful" to the defense, absent a showing by the defendant that the inform­
ant's testimony was necessary beyond mere speculation. Id. at 1387. 
69. 71 N.J. 373, 365 A.2d 914 (1976). See also note 68 supra. 
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duced to defendant by the informant who was present throughout 
the meeting and participated in the general discussion. The infor­
mant, however, neither negotiated the sale nor participated in or 
witnessed the actual transaction. 7o Although essentially relying on a 
defense of mistaken identity, defendant made no special showing 
that disclosure of the informant's identity would have been helpful 
to his defense. 71 Defendant testified on his own behalf, claiming 
that he was unable to recall his activities on the day in question 
since the alleged transaction took place six months before his arrest 
and indictment. Defendant denied that he had ever seen the po­
lice officer before the trial and denied selling narcotics on the 
date alleged. 72 The court found that the mere possibility that the 
informant's testimony might establish a defense of mistaken iden­
tity was too speculative to warrant disclosure in view of the infor­
mant's limited involvement in the transaction and the fact that the 
transaction took place in defendant's home and not on the street. 73 
Decisions involving informants have not been uniform in al­
lowing disclosure even when the informant witnessed both the ne­
gotiations and the transaction. 74 In United States v. Davis75 the 
court refused to require disclosure even though the informant had 
introduced two narcotics agents to defendant. The court observed 
that the informer did not bargain, pay for, or receive the drugs. Al­
though the informant was present at the transaction and undoubt­
edly contributed to the "atmosphere of confidence" that induced 
defendant to deal with the agents, the court determined that dis­
closure would not aid a defense based solely on mistaken iden­
tity.76 
Davis is distinguishable from Wandix on its facts. In Davis, 
two agents dealt directly with defendant on two occasions. During 
the course of the investigation both agents filed written reports ac­
70. Id. at 379, 365 A.2d at 917. 
71. Id. at 390, 365 A.2d at 923. 
72. Id. at 392, 365 A.2d at 924. 
73. Id. at 391, 365 A.2d at 924. 
74. United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1973). In State v. Taylor, 
508 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. App. 1974), the court, emphasizing the purpose of the privilege 
to protect the public interest in effective law enforcement, held that no disclosure 
was required of an informant who made the initial offer to buy narcotics from the de­
fendant, and was present at the transaction, but was not the sole witness or partici­
pant. See text accompanying note 18 supra. See also State v. Yates, 442 S.W.2d 21 
(Mo. 1969) discussed in text accompanying notes 80 & 82 infra. 
75. 487 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1973). 
76. Id. at 1251 (quoting Gilmore v. United States, 256 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 
1958)). 
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curately describing the accused's physical appearance, including a 
tatoo. Defendant was the registered owner of the automobile used 
during the two transactions. 77 Such corroborating details clearly 
were absent in Wandix. Additionally, Davis was the sole witness in 
his own behalf; despite his assertion of mistaken identity, he intro­
duced no alibi testimony and did not contradict the two agents'. tes­
timony.78 Thus, defendant's need for identification of the informant 
would not have been sufficient to outweigh the state's interest 
since, in the absence of contradictory testimony, the assumption 
persists that the informant will corroborate the police testimony. 
Such an assumption is necessary in light of other interests in 
denying disclosure that lie at the heart of the informer's privi­
lege. 79 
State v. Yates80 held that disclosure was not required on the 
basis of facts that revealed that the informant accompanied an 
officer to the premises; entered the premises with him, and wit­
nessed the transaction but did not actively participate in the crimi­
nal offense. The court noted that other lay witnesses who were 
present at the transaction in defendant's home were available to 
testify as to defendant's asserted noninvolvement. Disclosure, there­
fore, was held to be unnecessary. 81 
On the other hand, some courts have required disclosure on 
the basis of much less compelling levels of participation, apparently 
to assure the defendant an adequate opportunity to prepare his de­
fense. The court in People v. Williams 82 was faced with facts simi­
lar to those present in Davis83 and Taylor.84 The Williams court 
ordered disclosure of the identity of an informant who introduced a 
police agent to a drug seller he knew. Defense counsel asserted 
that the officer, who was the only witness for the prosecution, saw 
the drug seller for only a few minutes three months prior to d~­
fendant's arrest and indictment. The informant was deemed to 
have been instrumental in bringing about the transaction so his tes­
timony was material to a defense of mistaken identity. The court 
recognized that prior cases generally required disclosure when the 
77. [d. 
78. [d. at 1250. 
79. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra. 
80. 442 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1969). 
81. [d. at 26. 
82. 51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1958). 
83. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra. 
84. 508 S.W. 2d at 506. See also text accompanying notes 28-35 supra. 
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informant had 'participated in the crime but noted that disclosure 
was not restricted to such instances "since it is based upon materi­
ality of the informer's identity to the defense."85 In Gilmore v. 
United States86 an informant did more than merely supply informa­
tion when he introduced the undercover agent to the drug seller. 
The court found that the informant "was an active participant in 
setting the stage, in creating the atmosphere of confidence before­
hand and in continuing it by his close presence during the mo­
ments of critical conversation. "87 According to the testimony of the 
undercover narcotics agent, defendant's only connection with the 
heroin found in the agent's car was the conversation between the 
two which occurred in a tavern. The informant was shown to have 
been within hearing distance of this conversation. Due to the na­
ture of the transaction, the conversation was the crucial event. 88 In 
requiring disclosure of the informant's identity, the court also ob­
served that, in view of his possible motives and interest, the in­
formant's testimony might be relevant to his credibility. 
The jury might well have considered it important in passing on 
credibility to know whether charges . . . were or were not then 
pending against. , . [the informant], whether immunity or pref­
erence had been promised him if he undertook to work up or 
work on other cases, whether he was an addict, whether he had 
previously known defendant or had dealings with him that might 
have given rise to the hope of vengeance, and the like. 89 
By alluding to the informant's motives, the court looked beyond his 
involvement in the transaction in question to other factors which 
could be of importance when the informant was confronted with the 
defendant's alibi testimony or the assertion of an entrapment de­
fense. An additional factor favoring disclosure was that the govern­
ment's objection was based solely on the traditional privilege. 90 
Once the defense had demonstrated the need for the informant's 
testimony, the government was required to specify why disclosure 
85. 51 Cal. 2d at 359, 333 P.2d at 21. 
86. 256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958). An agent and defendant negotiated a narcotics 
sale in a tavern. The infonnant was present during part of the negotiations. The 
drugs were placed on the front of the agent's car where he subsequently found them. 
Id. at 566-67. 
87. Id. at 567. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 566. 
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should not be permitted. The government would prevail if its in­
terests outweighed those of the defense. 91 
The requirement of participation was further relaxed in State 
v. Najziger,92 in which the accused defended himself on the basis 
of mistaken identity. The informant's identity was ordered revealed 
since he was the only witness to the drug transaction other than 
the police officer and a person known only as "Bill." The court 
found that the informant's testimony was "relevant and material" to 
the identity of the drug seller,93 emphasizing that "no effort was 
made by the state to present any facts to weigh the scales toward 
nondisclosure. "94 The court also observed that "[i]n a case 
involving an identity question, mere presence of the informant and 
the opportunity to observe the alleged violator and, therefore, be 
in a position to either support the State's identification testimony 
or weaken it, becomes critical. "95 
One point generally agreed upon in cases dealing with the is­
sue of disclosure of an informant's identity is that the defendant has 
the burden of showing the necessity for disclosure and of 
demonstrating that the informant's testimony would be helpful and 
relevant to the defense. One area of inconsistency among the 
Courts, however, is in the type of showing the defendant must 
make. Roviaro suggests that certain affirmative defenses, such as 
entrapment, mistaken identity, or mistake with respect to the con­
tents of a package, may require disclosure after the competing in­
terests in the case have been balanced.96 Subsequent decisions 
91. ld. In United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1980), the possible 
motives of an informant were recognized in a case in which the informant testified at 
trial. The Ninth Circuit approved cautionary instructions given to the jury, directing 
them 
that an informant's testimony is to be examined with greater care than that 
of an ordinary witness . . . to determine whether the testimony of the in­
former was affected by self interest and by prejudice against the defendant, 
... that the informer, as an immunized witness, may have realized that his 
freedom might depend on incriminating another and that this could be a 
motive falsify his testimony. 
ld. at 812. Although not required to so rule in the case before them, the court also 
noted that the judge may instruct the jury as to the credibility of a witness-informant 
who is a drug addict if that fact is established. Id. 
92. 534 S.W.2d 480 (1975) cited in State v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d at 85 (majority 
opinion). An informant and an officer went to a house where six to eleven people 
were present. The informant witnessed the negotiation and sale of drugs to the offi­
cer. 
93. ld. at 482. 
94. ld. at 484. 
95. ld. at 482. 
96. 353 U.S. at 64. 
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demonstrate that merely alleging the defense, without more, will 
not compel disclosure nor even require the prosecution to assert 
more than the traditional privilege. In such an instance the privi­
lege is presumed, and the prosecution need not offer specific rea­
sons why the identity of the particular informant should not be re­
vealed. 
Several cases illustrate the showing that the defense must 
ma,ke. In United States v. Coke97 the court refused to order disclo­
sure because defendant made no showing that the informant's iden­
tity would be relevant and helpful to his defense or essential to a 
fair trial. Further, the defense sought the informant's testimony on 
the question of mistaken identity on appeal, rather than at the 
trial. 98 In another decision, a motion for disclosure again was 
denied when the informant's identity was sought to support a 
motion to suppress evidence seized and not to prove the value of 
the informant's identity to the defense. 99 In a third instance, de­
fense counsel made no showing that the informant's testimony 
might help to establish defendant's innocence. 1OO Other courts 
have refused disclosure on similar grounds: When the defense 
merely speculates as to the relevancy of the informant's testi­
mony;lOl or when the request for disclosure is made solely to es­
tablish the informant's reliability and the defense has failed to in­
97. 339 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1964). An informant introduced defendant to the nar­
cotics agent. The court found that he had been significantly involved in the criminal 
events. See also United States v. Russ, 362 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1966). 
98. [d. at 184. See also State v. Thompkins, 515 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1974). De­
fense counsel's objection at trial to the court's refusal to require disclosure was based 
on the sole grou\1d that he was entitled to the names of all persons present at a con­
versation between the police officer and defendant at the time of the sale. [d. at 811. 
Defense counsel did not request disclosure of the informant's identity on the ground 
that it would cast doubt on the officer's positive identification of defendant until the 
c~se was appealed. [d. In addition, defense made no effort to call a known witness to 
the transaction, although he apparently was in a position to refute the officer's identi­
fication of the defendant. [d. 
99. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964). 
100. Defendant made no special showing that the informant's testimony would 
be helpful to his defense. The court found that the possibility that an informant's tes­
timony might establish a defense of mistaken identity was too speculative to warrant 
disclosure. State v. Milligan, 71 N.J. 373, 365 A.2d 914 (1976). 
101. See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra. In United States v. Estrella, 567 
F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1977), the court emphasized that "mere speculation as to the use­
fulness of the informant's testimony . . . is insufficient to justify disclosure of his 
identity." [d. at 1153. The defendant must indicate some concrete circumstances that 
might justify overcoming both the public interest in encouraging the flow of informa­
tion ... and the informant's private interest in his own safety." [d. See also United 
States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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troduce evidence or testimony in support of its motions. 102 A lucid 
comment on the defense burden was made by Justice Traynor of 
the California Supreme Court: "[t]hey need not prove conclusively 
before disclosure the very fact they seek to obtain through disclo­
sure. Such certainty of proof is not required as a foundation for ob­
taining the identity of an informer who might be helpful to the de­
fense of the accused. "103 
Courts have required disclosure when the defense merely 
moved for disclosure but the state failed to present facts to rebut 
the need for it. The bare allegation by the state that the infor­
mant's life would be endangered has been held insufficient to deny 
disclosute. 104 In State v. Davis,105 the informant and the drug 
seller were the sole participants in the crime charged. There was 
no testimony that the informant's safety would be threatened by 
disclosure. The court noted that the state's failure to call the in­
formant as a witness raised "an unfavorable inference that his testi­
mony would have been favorable to and would have corroborated 
that of defendant. "106 
As these cases demonstrate, the flexible standards set forth in 
Roviaro have bee~ applied inconsistently.107 This disparate treat­
ment of Roviaro's significant factors has resulted in uncertainty and 
confusion among defense attorneys and judges as to the magnitude 
of the burden that the defense must bear before disclosure will be 
ordered. Conversely, the courts have shown deference toward the 
government's interests even though the substance of the infor­
mant's testimony is accessible to the prosecution exclusively. Ironi­
cally, when such deference is shown, the trial judge, who must 
balance the parties' conflicting interests, bases his decision on inad­
equate information. 
IV. THE ROVIARO DILEMMA AND THE IN CAMERA PROCEEDING 
There is little dispute that the government and law enforce­
ment agencies are privileged to withhold the names of those who 
102. State v. Hubble, 494 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. App. 1973). The court found it to be 
of "paramount importance that counsel for defendant at no time, directly or by innu­
endo, advised the trial court that disclosure of the informant's identity would consti­
tute a means of throwing doubt on the defendant's identity as the person who 
committed the crime charged." Id. at 361. 
103. People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 773-74,44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 328, 401 P.2d 
934,936 (1965) (en bane). 
104. State v. Nafziger, 534 S.W.2d at 484. 
105. 450 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1970). 
106. Id. at 173. 
107. Roviaro's 'flexible standards are listed in text accompanying notes 53-54 
supra. 
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communicate information concerning possible violations of law. The 
rationale for the privilege is simply that: "[c]ommunications of this 
kind ought to receive encouragement. They are discouraged if the 
informer's identity is disclosed."108 The privilege, however, is lim­
ited by society's interest in assuring a fair trial for one accused of a 
. crime, in deterring illegal actions by law enforcement officials, and 
in discouraging the communication of false information by those 
who supply such information. l09 One conclusion can clearly be 
drawn from the post-Roviaro decisions: the trial courts have diffi­
culty applying Roviaro's elusive standards to the sparse facts usu­
ally before them and in reaching a decision that is fundamentally 
fair. "In the informer situation the burden placed upon the trial 
judge is great since he must often balance conflicting interests 
without being aware of what relevant information, if any, the in­
former possesses. "110 It is apparent from many decisions that the 
balancing required by Roviaro has been conducted largely by spec­
ulation since the value of the informant's testimony would be diffi­
cult to ascertain if not produced in court. 11l 
This conundrum has been eased in some federal courts by 
conducting in camera hearings on the question of disclosure,1l2 
These proceedings enable the trial judge to balance the conflicting 
interests outside the courtroom by allowing him to question the in­
formant and thereby to assess the potential value of his testimony 
to the defense. In camera hearings also allow the court to deter­
mine the informant's role in the pending action, any reward or 
benefit promised to him for providing information, his drug use or 
possible addiction, charges pending against him, his degree of in­
volvement in ongoing investigations, and potential danger to him if 
his identity were disclosed in open court. 113 A record of the hear­
ing is preserved for review in the event of appeal. In camera pro­
ceedings may be conducted by affidavit, or the judge may require 
the informant to appear in chambers for examination. The hearings 
may be adversarial if the judge so rules; but, if counsel for one 
108. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374, at 761-62 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
109. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON 
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND FOR STATE COURTS 
510-18-19 (1980). 
110. United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
392 U.S. 932 (1968). 
111. See generally, J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 90, ~ 510.06, at 
510-34-46. 
112. United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. 
Jackson, 384 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968). 
113. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 90, at 510-25. 
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party is allowed to attend, all counsel should be pennitted to at­
tend. Those present are enjoined from revealing the testimony or 
identity of the informant. 114 
Justice McLaughlin, in a compelling concurring opinion in 
United States v. Day, U5 considered the difficulty encountered by 
the trial judge in balancing the conflicting interests of the defense 
and the state as "the practical incapacitation to look beyond a mere 
statement of facts and evaluate the interests concerned. "116 He 
further noted that "a trial judge is not privy to the activities or 
cognition of an infonner and unless the court is aided by evidence 
from collateral sources it must indulge in a judicial guessing game 
and rule in favor of one interest at th,e possible expense of the 
other."U7 The judge noted that an in camera proceeding is an ap­
propriate "collateral source" since Roviaro vested in the trial judge 
the power to use his discretion in resolving the issue of disclosure. 
The in camera hearing is a crucial tool in rendering a fundamen­
tally fair decision. us 
Justice McLaughlin's opinion has been cited with approval in 
later decisions that have recognized the tremendous burden on the 
trial judge to balance the conflicting interests when he must rule 
without benefit of the informant's testimony.U9 The Eighth Circuit 
114. See generally, Annot., 1 LEd. 2d 1998-2011 (1957) (Later Case Servo 
Supp. 1980). 
115. 384 F.2d 464, 466 (3d Cir, 1967) (McLaughlin, J., concurring). The major­
ity found it unnecessary to reach the question of the in camera hearing conducted by 
the trial judge. 
116. The judge continued: 

In most situations the accused will demand disclosure in the hope that the 

informer's testimony can substantiate his defense. But if disclosure on a 

mere supposition is required in every instance the interests of law enforce­

ment in combatting the illegal narcotics traffic will be detrimentally affected 

by the emasculation of its only effective weapon-the informer. 

Id. at 469. 
117. Id. at 470. 
118. Id. 
119. With respect to an in camera hearing in which the informant testified un­
der oath as to his knowledge of the crime, the Jackson court stated: "The advantage 
of the procedure is that it enables the court to view with a keener perspective the 
factual circumstances upon which it must rule and attaches to the court's ruling a 
more abiding sense of fairness than could otherwise have been realized." United 
States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1967). 
In United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1968), the court remanded the 
case to the district court with instructions to conduct an in camera proceeding "for 
the purpose of determining whether disclosure of the informer's identity would have 
been relevant and helpful to the defendant in presenting her defense, and whether 
the informer was available as a witness." Id. at 417. 
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has suggested that in camera hearings on the issue of disclosure are 
essential to a fair balance of the conflicting interests. 120 More sig­
nificant, the United States Supreme Court has approved of the in 
camera proceeding as a vehicle for resolving the disclosure is­
sue. 121 ''!be Fifth Circuit has accepted post-trial in camera examina­
tion of the informant to test the informant's ability to identify the 
defendant. 122 It should be noted that merely holding an in camera 
120. United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 908 (1973). See also United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974): 
[I]iI most situations an in camera hearing provides a salutary means by 
which to satisfY the balancing of interests required by Roviaro. The interests 
of law enforcement are served by protecting the identity of the informant ex­
cept where a need is demonstrated for disclosure by the informant's own 
testimony, and not by the speculative claims of the defendant. A fair trial is 
promoted by requiring disclosure whenever the in camera hearing demon­
. strates that the informant's identity would be 'relevant and helpful' .... 
Id. at 7 (citation omitted). 
121. The United States Supreme Court recognized the value of the in camera 
hearing on the issue of disclosure and mandated such proceedings in the PROPOSED 
R. EVID. FOR U.S. CTS. & MAGISTRATES 510, promulgated in 1972. Congress, how­
ever, did not include the rules pertaining to privileges that had been proposed by 
the Court in the FED. R. EVID., subsequently adopted. Congress substituted R. 501 
in place of the 13 rules proposed. R. 501 left the law of privileges in its present state, 
and further provided that privileges shall continue to be developed by the courts of 
the United States under a uniform standard applicable in both civil and criminal 
cases. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted on Dec. 16, 1974, were signed 
into law on Jan. 2, 1975, became effective on July 1, 1975, and are codified as 28 
U.S.C. ~~ 1731-1746. Proposed Rule 510 states: 
(2) Testimony on merits. If it appears from the evidence in the case or from 
other showing by a party that an informer may be able to give testimony 
necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in a crim­
inal case ... and the government invokes the privilege, the judge shall give 
the government an opportunity to show in camera facts relevant to 
determining whether the informer can, in fact, supply that testimony. The 
showing will ordinarily be in the form of affidavits, but the judge may direct 
that testimony be taken if he finds that the matter cannot be resolved satis­
factOrily upon affidavit. If the judge finds that there is a reasonable probabil­
ity that the informer can give the testimony, and the government elects not 
to disclose his identity, the judge on motion of the defendant in a criminal 
case shall dismiss the charges to which the testimony would relate, and the 
judge may do so on his own motion.... Evidence submitted to the judge 
shall be sealed and preserved to be made available to the appellate court in 
the event of an appeal, and the contents shall not otherwise be revealed 
without consent of the government. All counsel and parties shall be 
permitted to be present at every stage of proceedings under this subdivision 
except a showing in camera, at which no counselor party shall be permitted 
to be present. 
56 F.R.D. 183, 255-56 (1972). 
122. United States v. Doe, 525 F.2d 878, 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
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hearing on the issue of disclosure does not of itself satisfy the 
Roviaro balancing test. To hold against the defendant the trial 
court, after considering all relevant factors, must find the govern­
ment's reasons for denying disclosure to be substantiaP23 
Although the in camera proceeding is not infallible, and in no 
wise guarantees that a fair result will be reached, it enables the 
trial court to make its decision from a far more informed position 
than is otherwise possible. It allows the judge to ascertain the "rel­
evant factors"124 significant to the issue of disclosure. If, after such 
a proceeding, the court decides that the informant's testimony 
would be "relevant and helpful" or necessary for a fair determina­
tion, disclosure must be made, or the action must be dismissed. 
The in camera hearing should be granted only after some 
showing that the informant's testimony may be necessary to the de­
fense; this showing cannot be based solely on speculation or con­
jecture. The hearing provides a means to ascertain the need for the 
testimony without doing violence to the public interest or unfairly 
depriving the defendant of important evidence. The Wandix situa­
tion is particularly suited to this form of determination, but neither 
the trial court nor the Missouri Supreme Court considered the po­
tential effectiveness of this option. 
An in camera hearing on the question of disclosure would in­
disputably allow a more expeditious and informed resolution of the 
disclosure dilemma, but a significant problem remains, notably, 
when to employ such procedures. Defense counsel and the courts 
do not have suitable criteria to employ in determining when an in 
camera interview of the informant is appropriate. 
V. DEFENSE BURDEN AND COURT'S DISCRETION 
When disclosure was denied without the benefit of an in cam­
era hearing, the Fifth Circuit foupd it appropriate .in at least one 
instance to remand the case to the district court with directions to 
976 (1976). Regarding an alibi defense, the court stated: 
the district court correctly reasoned that disclosure would not be warranted 
unless the informant either could not positively identify _Lujan ur possessed 
some other evidence that would tend to exonerate the defendant. Both the 
in camera interview and the test identification procedures provided the 
court with precisely the sort of information upon which its ruling on disclo­
sure should have been based.... 
Id. at 880. 
123. United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1978). 
124. 353 U.S. at 62. 
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conduct a hearing and to supplement the record with findings 
based upon the standards of Roviaro. 125 Such instructions are not 
automatic, however, and the criteria courts use to resolve the 
question are not consistent. 126 The showing that the defense must 
make in order to be granted an in camera hearing on the question 
of disclosure is uncertain, as Alvarez v. United States 127 reveals. 
Defendant's failure to request an in camera hearing on the issue of 
disclosure was held to be a ground for denying defense motions 
seeking disclosure of the informant's identity, despite the fact that 
the defense requested disclosure, based on Roviaro, five times 
during trial. Even though the defense's intention was clear, the 
judge failed to order a hearing on his own motion, though such an 
option was within his discretion since he was charged with balancing 
the conflicting interests. 
Under the standards set forth in Roviaro and subsequent cases 
approving the in camera procedure, the initial burden is on the de­
fense to demonstrate the need for disclosure. It is generally con­
ceded that the burden is not satisfied if the request is based solely 
on speculation or conjecture128 for the defense must show the sub­
stance and relevance of the informant's testimony in light of the af­
firmative defense asserted. 129 What should be apparent, though it 
is not always acknowledged, is that the defense must make less of a 
showing to obtain an in camera hearing than to be granted an or­
der for disclosure. Thus, although the initial burden is on the de­
fendant, when his proof is marginal there is little reason to deny 
resolution of the issue in camera, absent extraordinary circum­
stances demonstrated by the prosecution. 
A. Mistaken Identity Defense 
It is in the area of the defense burden that conflict may arise 
concerning the sufficiency of the showing and the right of the ac­
cused to refuse to testify. Such a conflict rarely arises in cases in 
which the defense of mistaken identity is asserted. The defense, by 
125. See United States v. Fischer, 531 F.2d 783 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Freund, 525 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1976). 
126. See United States v. Smith, 595 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1979); Alvarez v. United States, 525 F.2d 980 (5th 
_ Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995 (1976). 
127. 525 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1976). 
128. United States v. Estrella, 567 F.2d 1151, 1153 (1st Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d 329, 330 (9th Cir. 1971). 
129. United States v. Hansen, 569 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1978). 
760 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:739 
its very nature, usually entails the testimony of alibi witnesses who 
are subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. In addition, 
the testimony of alibi witnesses is scrutinized by jurors on the mat­
ter of credibility. The court, however, should not permit such tes­
timony to be summarily disregarded when the witnesses are 
friends or acquaintances of the defendant, the usual sources of alibi 
testimony. The prosecution has an opportunity to confront the 
witnesses and to attack their credibility without subjecting the in­
formant to similar confrontation. When an affirmative defense of 
mistaken identity is presented and supported by witness testimony, 
in the' interest of fairness. the judge should find that the defense 
has met its burden and should require an in camera interview of 
the informant. The court may then make an initial determination of 
the level of the informant's involvement,130 the value of the in­
formant's testimony to the defense,131 and the possibility that the 
jury would find the testimony of the informant less credible than 
that of the alibi witnesses,132 and then appraise such factors in light 
of the government's reasons for nondisclosure. 
The courts have shown a marked trend toward requiring hear­
ings in cases where mistaken identity defenses are asserted,133 and 
the circuit courts have remanded cases with directions to conduct 
in camera interviews and to supplement the record with an order 
that applies the balancing test of Roviaro. 134 
In United States v. Fischer, 135 the trial judge refused to order 
disclosure of the identity of an informant who introduced two 
agents to defendant and was present at a series of negotiations 
when drugs purportedly were tested but not purchased. The de­
fense, alleging that no transaction took place, relied on the alibi 
testimony of two women who were present at the first meeting 
who stated that no incriminating conversations occurred and no co­
caine changed hands. 136 The court of appeals considered the possi­
130. United States v. Alonzo, 571 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
847 (1978). 
131. United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414, 417 (6th Cir. 1968). 
132. Gilmore v. United States. F.2d at 567. 
133. Suarez v. United States, 582 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Silva, 580 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Doe, 525 F.2d 878 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975). . 
134. See United States v. Fischer, 531 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1976), and United 
States v. Freund, 525 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1976). 
135. 531 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1976). 
136. ld. at 785. 
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ble range of situations where the need for disclosure might arise, 
as well as the likely disposition of each case. When the informant is 
a m~re tipster, no disclosure is required under Roviaro. 137 If the 
informant played a crucial role in the transaction, as he did in 
Roviaro, disclosure and production would be crucial to a fair 
trial. 13S If there is a slight possibility that the defendant might ben­
efit from disclosure but the government demonstrates a compel­
ling need to protect the informant's identity, disclosure is not 
required. 139 
The court determined that the record in Fischer was unclear 
as to which category was applicable but found the informant's par­
ticipation to be "active and significant. "140 The justices, however, 
were unable to ascertain whether the informant's role alone 
compelled disclosure, regardless of the government's showing in 
opposition. Since the truthfulness of the defense witnesses was a 
major issue and the court noted that an in camera hearing would 
best accommodate the competing government and individual inter­
ests, it remanded to the district court. The directions on remand 
instructed that the trial judge should: (1) Question the informant in 
camera to ascertain whether his testimony might be helpful to the 
defendant; (2) question the informant and government counsel with 
regard to the government interests in resisting disclosure; and (3) 
supplement the record with an order that applied the Roviaro bal­
ancing test to the facts of the case. 141 
In United States v. Silva 142 the trial court denied disclosure 
following a post-trial in camera interview with the informant. De­
fendant alleged mistaken identity, contending a frame-up by the 
police, by the informant, or by both. 143 He relied solely on his 
own testimony. On appeal the court considered ~o of the three 
factors noted in Roviaro: (1) The possible defenses of mistaken 
identity, entrapment, or mistake as to the contents of the package 
and (2) the potential significance of the informant's testimony.l44 
Both were found to weigh heavily in favor of disclosure. l45 The 
137. Id. at 787. 
138. ld. 
139. ld.. 
140. ld. 
141. ld. at 788. 
142. 580 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1978). 
143. The accused alleged that the .. 'frame-up' ... was due to his previous law 
enforcement background." ld. at 146. 
144. ld. at 147. 

. 145. ld. 
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court decided that, since defendant allegedly had no knowledge of 
the transaction, he needed the informant's testimony to refute that 
of the agent testifying for the prosecution. Alternatively, assuming 
that -the absent informant would corroborate the agent's testimony, 
the court found that the informant was "essential to enable the [de­
fendant] to develop his theory that he had been framed. "146 
Finally, the government failed to present any "other relevant fac­
tors" to justify nondisclosure besides general policy,147 Therefore, 
despite the fact that an in camera hearing had been conducted, dis­
closure was denied improperly since the informant was the only 
witness in a position to support or contradict the testimony of the 
lone agent who participated in the transaction. 148 
The mistaken identity and alibi defenses often provide the 
court with additional methods, independent of the in camera hear­
ing, to resolve the disclosure issue. Thus, in Suarez v. United 
States,149 the identity of the informant was not essential to the de­
fense since defendant could have called witnesses to testify regard­
ing his activities on the numerous dates when he allegedly was in­
volved in gambling ventures. Because of the availability of other 
witnesses, the' informant was not the only possible source of excul­
patory information. 15o In United States v. Doe 151 the Fifth Circuit 
held that disclosure is not warranted when the defendant asserts an 
alibi defense unless the informant could not positively identify the 
defendant or t4e informant possessed some other evidence that 
would tend to e~nerate the accused. 152 
B. Entrapment Defense 
The decisions concerning in camera proceedings have been in­
consistent and the standards applied have been less than clear 
when other defenses are asserted, particularly the defense of 
entrapment. The entrapment defense was enumerated specifically 
in Roviaro as an affirmative defense that might require disclo­
sure,153 but it has not been regarded so generously in subsequent 
decisions. Even though evidence of entrapment is almost exclu­
146. Id. 
147. Id. at n.3. 
148. Id. at 147. 
149. 582 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1978). 
150. Id. at 1012. 
151. 525 F.2d 878 (5th Cir.), cerro denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976). 
152. Id. at 880. 
153. 353 U.S. at 69. 
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sively in the control of the government, the courts frequently re­
quire the defense to introduce a significant amount of evidence be­
fore they will order an in camera hearing regarding disclosure of 
the informant's identity. 
Entrapment is an affirmative defense upon which the defen­
dant must present some testimony demonstrating government in­
ducement and involvement before the issue is raised properly. 
"[TJhis initial burden on the defendant to produce some evidence 
of entrapment has important ramifications for disclosure of an in­
formant's identity under Roviaro. Unless some evidence of en­
trapment is adduced by the defendant, thereby properly raising 
the defense, disclosure would be unjustifiable. "154 According to the 
Fifth Circuit, the defense must present a prima facie case that the 
government's conduct has created "a substantial risk that the of­
fense would be committed by a person other than one ready to 
commit it. "155 Because such information is often available only to 
the prosecution, the defendant may be forced to testify in his own 
behalf in order to adduce sufficient evidence to warrant an in cam­
era hearing on the issue of disclosure and to properly place the de­
fense in issue. 
The defense dilemma in such cases is aggravated when two 
unrelated defenses are put forth. In Alvarez v. United States, 156 
defendant asserted a defense of entrapment and, alternatively, a 
defense of insanity. The defense moved for disclosure five times 
during the course of trial on the issue of entrapment. The sub­
stance of each motion was that one of the agents who had partici­
pated in the negotiations for the sale of drugs, most of which were 
conducted in Spanish, died before trial. The agent who testified, 
however, neither spoke nor understood Spanish. Defense counsel 
sought to demonstrate that, since no other independent evidence 
of entrapment existed, the informant's testimony was essential. De­
fendant did not testify and disclosure was denied, without the 
benefit of an in camera hearing, because the entrapment defense 
had no basis in the evidence. 157 On appeal, defendant asserted that 
he could not have testified on the question of entrapment since he 
would have destroyed the good faith of his insanity defense. The 
154. United States v. Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70, 75 (5th Cir. 1979). 
155. United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 826 (1975) (quoting Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 
1969)). 
156. 525 F.2d at 980. 
157. Id. at 981. 
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court of appeals found that the defense had not met its initial bur­
den because it should have requested an in camera hearing on the 
issue of disclosure if it had been so concerned with preserving the 
good faith of the insanity defense. ISS Thus, if disclosure were 
permitted in this case, the identity of informants would have to be 
disclosed whenever the twin defenses of insanity and entrapment 
were asserted. 159 
A conflict arises when the defendant alleges entrapment or as­
serts two alternative defenses, and also seeks disclosure of an in­
formant's identity: the defendant may be forced to compromise his 
fifth amendment right to refuse to testify. "While a defendant's si­
lence is not inherently inconsistent with a defense of entrapment, 
. . . such silence cannot provide the grounds for disclosure . . . . If 
disclosure was required whenever a defendant elected not to testifY 
and to allege entrapment, then the Government's interest in con­
fidentiality could not be adequately safeguarded. "160 The court did 
not suggest that one method that might be utilized to resolve this 
conflict would be to conduct an in camera hearing on the issue of 
disclosure. 
The Fifth Circuit failed to resolve this question in United 
States v. Godkins,161 in which defendant asserted that he knew the 
informant and intended to call him as a witness to develop a de­
fense of entrapment. The trial court forbade the defense, under 
penalty of contempt, from producing the informant as a witness at 
trial. In addition, during a meeting in chambers the judge prohib­
ited any defense examination of a government agent on matters 
pertaining to the informant's identity, reliability, or the level of his 
involvement in the crime charged. Perhaps ,most significant, the 
trial court ruled that defendant could not testifY in camera as to the 
informant's identity, which he claimed he knew, without waiving 
his privilege against self-incrimination at trial. The accused thus 
was forced to rely on a defense of insanity. 162 
On appeal the court failed to lend any guidance to defense 
counsel or the trial court. The Fifth Circuit simply ruled that dis­
closure must be made. 163 The court noted that the concerns that 
prompted the Roviaro test are not present when the identity of the 
158. ld. at 982. 
159. ld. at 983. 
160. United States v. Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1979). 
161. 527 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1976). 
162. ld. at 1323. 
163. ld. at 1326. 
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informant is known to the defendant since the defense is simply 
seeking to exercise its sixth amendment right to call a witness and 
is not seeking disclosure of a confidential informant. l64 Although 
the defendant's rights were suitably protected by such a result, the 
state's interests arguably were not, as noted by the specially con­
curring opinion. 16S No aid was provided for handling similar con­
flicts' in the future. 
The Fifth Circuit retained its rigid approach to the entrapment 
defense in United States v. Gonzalez,166 which involved four meet­
ings between an undercover agent and defendant. Informants at­
tended all four meetings. 167 In denying disclosure, the court noted 
that entrapment is an affirmative defense that is properly raised 
only when the defendant introduces evidence that he was induced 
to commit the offense. 168 The court further observed that defen­
dant did not testify on his own behalf and that no specific facts were 
asserted that the informant's testimony might establish. 
In Encinas-Sierras v. United States, 169 defendant asserted 
entrapment and lack of knowledge of the contents of the package as 
defenses to a charge of unlawfully importing heroin. Both defenses 
were specifically noted in Roviaro. 170 Defendant in Encinas 
testified on his own behalf concerning the events leading to his 
capture by border guards who had received his description from an 
informant. Defendant also maintained that he had acquired the 
package only ten minutes prior to crossing the border. The border 
guard testified that the informant and the man defendant identified 
as the source of the package were not the same person. l71 Thus on 
the question of entrapment, without the aid of an in camera hear­
ing, the court refused to require disclosure since the informant was 
not the person who induced defendant to act.172 Disclosure also . 
was denied on the second defense for the court found that the in­
formant could not testify as to defendant's lack of knowledge of the 
package's contents or to his state of mind because both were ques­
tions of fact for the jury.173 
164. ld. at 1327. 
165. ld. at 1328. 
166. 606 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1979). 
167. ld. at 73-74. 
168. ld. at 75. 
169. 401 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968). 
170. 353 U.S. at 64. 
171. 401 F.2d at 230. 
172. ld. at 231. 
173. ld. at 231-32. 
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It is easy to understand the court's reluctance to require dis­
closure of an informant's identity whenever the defense of en­
trapment is alleged. It is harder to justify denial of an in camera 
hearing on the issue of disclosure, which is merely the vehicle for 
fairly resolving the more important question: The significance of 
the informant's testimony to the defense. In such cases it is clear . 
that only the government is privy to the substance of the infor­
mant's testimony and, ultimately, the inner machinations resulting in 
the defendant's arrest. The possibility also exists that the informant 
effected the entrapment without the knowledge of the agents with· 
whom he was working, thereby making disclosure imperative. The 
defense of entrapment is available if the paid informant supplied 
the drugs, "even if the informer entrapped the defendant on his 
own initiative, and regardless of whether any Government officer 
knows the source of the contraband. "174 
The fact that such cases do arise, though infrequently, sug­
gests that a defense of entrapment should not be discounted by the 
courts, particularly when the defendant testifies on his own behalf. 
The Fifth Circuit has not gone so far as the dicta in United States 
v. Gomez-Rojas17S suggested it might: "[w]here a defendant char­
ges that a paid Government informer has entrapped him, Roviaro 
ordinarily demands disclosure of the informer's identity, since the 
defendant's entire defense rests upon allegations which the in­
former is in a unique position to affirm or deny."176 Such a view 
admittedly is extreme and, if followed, would effectively eliminate 
the government's use of informants in areas in which their employ­
ment is particularly vital. Such an attitude, however, should be 
viewed as a tacit recommendation of the in camera hearing as a 
measure that fairly and effectively resolves the question of disclo­
sure without such drastic implications. 
The Washington Supreme Court sought to clarify the issues 
presented when the defense moves for disclosure of an informant's 
identity. That court has found that the purpose of the informer's 
privilege with its necessary limitations as set forth in Roviaro 177 is 
eminently satisfied by conducting an in camera hearing on the 
question.178 In State v. Harris 179 the Washington Supreme Court 
174. United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 826 (1975). 
175. Id. 
176. Id.at1219. 
177. 353 U.S. at 60-62. 
178. State v. Harris, 91 Wash. 2d 145, 588 P.2d 720 (1978). 
179. Id. 
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observed that "the preferred method for making this determination 
without prejudicing the rights of either the state or the defendant 
is for the court to hold an in camera session at which the judge 
hears the informer's testimony and applies the Roviaro 
standard."180 The courts following Harris recognized that the bur­
den that the defense must satisfy before a hearing will be ordered 
was still uncertain. In State v. Potter181 the Washington Court of 
Appeals sought to clarify this issue and to introduce consistency to 
this troublesome area. 
The trial court should apply a relevancy standard in exercising 
its discretion as to whether to hold an in camera hearing. The 
court should conduct an in camera hearing if the defendant 
makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may 
have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's inno­
cence. 182 
Applying the Roviaro balancing test in camera allows the triai 
court to make an "informed determination of whether the State's 
interest in refusing disclosure outweighs the interests of the de­
fendant. "183 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Potter converts the general "relevant and helpful" standard of 
Roviaro into a two-step process: The court first determines 
whether the informant may possess evidence that is relevant to the 
defendant's innocence; if he does, then an in camera hearing will 
be granted to ascertain whether disclosure should be ordered. The 
relevancy standard eases the initial burden of the defense to estab­
lish the need for an in camera hearing. This approach has much to 
recommend it in light of the problems previously noted: The possi­
bility of alternative defenses; the fifth amendment right of the ac­
cused to refuse to testify; the possible motives and interests of the 
informant; and the unique problems of the entrapment defense. 
The Potter approach is preferable because the disclosure decision 
will be made only after an actual balancing that is performed in the 
absence of the informant's testimony. In addition, the record of the 
hearing is preserved for appeal by either party. This permits the 
reviewing court to determine whether a proper balance was struck. 
180. [d. at 150, 588 P.2d at 723. 
181. 25 Wash. App. 624, 611 P.2d 1282 (1980). 
182. [d. at 628, 611 P.2d at 1284. 
183. [d. at 628-29, 611 P.2d at 1285. 
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Such in camera hearings do not require a relaxing of the Roviaro 
standards or 'a wholesale disregard of the state's interests and the 
informant's safety. Rather, they produce an informed judicial deci­
sion concerning the rights and interests of the parties. This ap­
proach recognizes the government's need for the informant and 
satisfies the primary purpose of the informer's privilege: To encour­
age the flow of information concerning possible violations of law to 
law enforcement officials. As noted by the Fifth Circuit: 
[t]he drug scene ... [is] ... a dark side of the contemporary 
American landscape .... [tlhe faceless informant is one of its 
standard inhabitants. Moved by a desire for vengeance or for 
money, by the hope of leniency for his own misdeeds, by revul­
sion at drug trafficking, or by any combination of the above, he 
is a resource of police intelligence information apparently indis­
pensable to their penetration of this criminal subculture. 184 
Byron D. Caplice 
184. United States v. Webster, 606 F.2d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing 
granted, 611 F.2d 623 (1980). 
